Global Justice and Liberalism’s Bind

Steven Scalet

One liberal method for imagining global justice is to elaborate and defend political notions such as “human dignity”, “decency”, or “reasonableness” in ways that are freestanding from religious and philosophical controversies. This approach to liberalism is also sometimes called “neutrality” or “impartial” liberalism. A fundamental goal of this approach is to establish the conditions under which a state or perhaps some international body can legitimately exercise coercive power to enforce the principles of justice derived from the theory. Unfortunately, there will always be some traditions and persons who will reject this type of liberal theory. What type of intellectual engagement do freestanding liberals owe to those who reject the theory? A freestanding theory of global justice builds its defense by avoiding controversial philosophical and religious doctrines. The hope is to find a basis for living together by restricting the grounds for debating justice. But restricting these grounds also limits what can be said to those who reject the resulting liberal theory. This limitation introduces a problem that I will call “the bind of freestanding liberalism.” Adopt a freestanding method of political justification; disrespect those who reject this method of political justification. This is the bind. The argument applies to anyone attracted to the idea that a liberal theory must be freestanding from religious and philosophical controversies that divide reasonable people. To illustrate, I show how John Rawls’ political liberalism is susceptible to this argument. I then discuss the method that any solution to liberalism’s bind must follow. This solution specifies minimal obligations that liberals owe to those who reject liberal ideals, obligations inconsistent with a freestanding method of justification. However compelling the original idea, liberals must abandon the search for a freestanding theory of global justice.